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Summary findings
Herrera,  Perry, and Quintero explain Latin America's  The second approach allows for effects on output by
growth slowdown in 1998-99. To do so, they use two  some endogenous variables, such as domestic real interest
complementary methodologies.  rates and real exchange rates. Using monthly industrial
The first aims at determining how much of the  production  data, the authors estimate country-specific
slowdown can be explained by specific external factors:  generalized vector autoregressions (GVAR) for the
the terms of trade, international interest rates, spreads on  largest countries.
external debt, capital flows, and climatological factors (El  They find that during the sample period (1992-98)
Nifio). Using quarterly GDP data for the eight largest  output volatility is mostly associated with shocks to
countries in the region, the authors  estimate a dynamic  domestic factors, but the slowdown in the subperiod
panel showing that 50-60  percent of the slowdown was  1998-99  is explained more than 60 percent by shocks to
due to these external factors.  the external factors.
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Abstract
The object of the paper is to explain Latin America's growth slowdown experienced in
1998/99.  To do so we used two complementary methodologies.  The first  one aimed at
determining how much of the slowdown could be explained by specific external factors,
namely, the terms of trade, international interest rates, spreads on external debt, capital
flows  and climatological  factors  (El Nino).  Using quarterly GDP data for  the 8 largest
countries of  the region, we estimate a dynamic panel  that allowed to calculate that
between 50% and 60% of the slowdown was due to the role of these externalfactors.  The
second approach allows for  the role of some endogenous variables, like domestic real
interest  rates  and  real  exchange rates,  to  affect  output.  Using monthly industrial
production  data,  we  estimate  country-specific  Generalized  Vector  Autoregressions
(GVAR)for the largest countries.  We  found that during the whole sample period (1992-
1998) output volatility was mostly associated with shocks to domestic factors,  but the
slowdown in the sub-period 1998-1999 was explained in more than 60% by the external
factors'  shocks.
I This  paper is a modified  version  of the presentations  in the Latin America  Round  Table  Conference,  Duff
and Phelps,  New York, April 15, 1999  and in the Harvard  Institute  for International  Development The
authors acknowledge  and thank excellent  research  assistance  by Conrado  Garcia and Bernadette  Ryan.
Comments by  Eliana Cardoso, Daniel Lederman, Deepak Mishra and Luis  Serven are gratefully
acknowledged.Ie-2
I. Introduction and Summary
During 1997-1999, Latin America was subject to external and internal shocks of sizable
magnitudes.  Consequently, the region's  growth rate in  1999 was negative for the first
time  since 1983. Among the external shocks, the most notable were  associated with
sudden stops in capital flows and terms of trade deterioration.  On the internal side, real
interest rates and i 4al exchange rates adjusted both endogenously in response to external
shocks and as a result of shifts in domestic factors such as policy variables.  How do
these variables interact with output fluctuations in Latin America, and in particular, what
is their relative importance in terms of explaining the 1998-1999 slowdown?
To answer these questions, we used two complementary approaches. In the first one, we
pooled quarterly data for the eight largest economies of the region and estimated panel
regressions for regional GDP growth, considering as exogenous external factors the terms
of trade, US real interest rates, non-Latin Brady bonds sovereign spreads, the current
account of industrialized countries (as a proxy for exogenous capital flows) and an index
of El Nino effect.  The role of internal factors and other non-specified external variables
was captured  by  means of  the  lagged value  of GDP  growth, which  also  subsumes
dynamic  effects in  the panel.  This  simple approach has  several advantages: first,  it
permits an assessment of the relative importance of external vs. domestic factors at the
regional level; second, by allowing the disturbances of the equations to be  related, it
captures interdependence among countries'  output fluctuations; finally,  by pooling the
data we  minimize small  sample problems.  The simplicity of this  method, however,
comes with drawbacks such as the lack of flexibility for country-specific analysis and the
absence of  explicit treatment of  domestic factors. To  overcome these limitations we
estimated  country-specific VARs  incorporating domestic  real  interest  rates  and  real
exchange rates as additional explanatory variables.
The paper is divided in three parts.  The first section presents the quarterly GDP panel
regression exercise used to determine the importance of external factors explaining the
regional  slowdown  . Using quarterly  data  from  1992 to  1998 for  the  eight  largest
countries of the region, we estimated panel regressions, and using the 1997 exogenous
external conditions as a benchmark, we found that at least 52% of the regional slowdown
was due to the adverse behavior of external factors.
The  second  section  summarizes  the  country-specific  "stylized  facts"  about  the
relationship between events in the external capital markets 2, terms of trade, domestic real
interest rates, real exchange rates and industrial production growth, using monthly data
2 To capture  the external  capital  markets  shocks  we use the Brady  Bond sovereign  spreads  provided  by JP
Morgan.  In the last section of the paper we discuss the inclusion of this "price"  variable instead of  a
"quantity" indicator.3
for the period 1992-1998. To capture the interaction among these variables we used the
Generalized  Vector  Autoregression methodology  (Koop, Pesaran  and  Potter,  1996).
Contrary to traditional VAR analysis, this approach yields variance decompositions and
impulse response functions  independent of any specific ordering of the variables or any
other restrictions imposed on the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form VAR
residuals.
Based on the generalized variance decompositions, we found that, for the whole sample
period  1992-1998, the  forecast error  variance of  output was explained primarily  by
shocks to domestic interest rates and the real exchange rate, which we labeled domestic
factors.  The notable exceptions were Argentina and Peru, where shocks to the external
variables (terms of trade and spreads on sovereign debt) accounted for a large share of the
variance relative to the domestic factors' proportion.  The dominance of internal factors
explaining output volatility, is common to other papers (Ahmed (1999), Hausman-Gavin
(1995), Hoffmaister and Roldos (1997).
On a country-by-country basis, we found that, during the seven years covered in our
sample, shocks to external capital markets were a relatively more important source of
output variability in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, while in Ecuador Peru and Venezuela
terms of trade shocks were the dominant explanatory factors of the output forecast error
variance. This differential effect of the role of external factors contrasts with previous
papers'  results  for the region as a whole  according to  which  capital markets shocks
dominate  over  the  terms  of  trade  shocks  (Hoffmaister-Roldos, 1997)  or  vice-versa
(Hausman-Gavin, 1995). In Chile and Colombia, domestic real interest rate shocks were
the principal  factors associated with  output variability.  Output variability  was also
associated with real exchange rate variability, specially in Brazil, Mexico and Colombia.
In general, we found that a depreciating shock to the real exchange rate is associated with
lower growth rates in the short run, as has been extensively documented for the region.
The third section concentrates on the sub-period 1997-1999 and on a sub-set of countries,
to  explain the slowdown in each of them.  Based on the generalized impulse-response
functions derived in  the previous  section and on the  estimated historical shocks that
affected each country during this sub-period, we found that external factors account for
the greatest part of the slowdown. For Argentina, we calculated that external factors
explain more than 60% of the slowdown in 1998-1999. In Brazil, the two major sources
of slowdown were the spreads shocks and the real interest rate shocks. In this country the
spreads shock had the largest impact on output. In Mexico the terms of trade and external
spreads accounted for the major part of the slowdown, but in this case, as with Brazil, our
models predicted a substantially larger slowdown than the one that actually occurred. In
Chile and Colombia we estimated that shocks to  domestic real interest rates were the
main sources of contractionary pressure in 1998, but in 1999 the terms of trade, external
spreads and the real depreciation explain most of the slowdown.4
II.  The Role of External Factors on the Regional Slowdown during 1998-1999
A noticeable feature of regional output growth in 1998 and 1999 was the magnitude and
persistence of the slowdown. Casual examination of quarterly GDP growth rates (Fig. 1)
shows that  the recent  slowdown is more persistent than that  experienced during the
Tequila episode 3. Regional GDP annual growth rates fell from 5.4% in 1997 to 2.3% in
1998 and to an expected -0.3%  in 1999 (Table 1).  In 1998 and 1999 the eight largest
Latin  American  economies  experienced decelerations  ranging  from  -13.5  to  -2.8
percentage points.  The 5.7% regional slowdown experienced between 1997 and 1999 is
only comparable, in magnitude, to the initial deceleration registered in 1982.
Figure 1
Latin America Big 8*: Quarterly  Gross Domestic  Product
(Neighted y-o-y growth rate)
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Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Mexico,  Pe- and  Venezuela.
The widespread nature of the slowdown strongly suggests that common factors were at
play, besides the particular domestic circumstances of each country.  In this section we
seek to quantify the relative importance of external factors vis-a vis the internal ones
accounting for the regional slowdown during 1998-1999.
3Comparisons  with the  eighties using quarterly GDP data was not possible due to non-existent data.  A
more thorough examination  of business cycles in Latin America during the eighties and the nineties,
probably  using monthly  industrial  output could be an interesting  task,  but falls beyond the scope of this
paper.5
Table  1.
Latin  American  GDP Growth  Rates
(in %)
GDP  Growth  Slowdown 3
1997  1998  19992  1999-1997
Argentina  8.1  3.9  -4.0  -12.1
Brazil  3.6  0.2  0.8  -2.8
Chile  7.6  3.4  -1.0  -8.6
Colombia  3.0  0.6  -4.5  -7.5
Ecuador  3.4  0.4  -7.3  -10.7
Mexico  6.8  4.9  3.6  -3.2
Peru  6.9  0.7  2.7  -4.2
Venezuela  5.9  -0.4  -7.0  -12.9
Weighted Average'  5.4  1.8  -0.2  -5.7
' Weighted  by 1997  GDP.
2 Forecasted  for 1999  based  on third  quarter  data
3Difference  between  1999  and 1997  growth  rates
The  idea  that  common  external  factors  are  fundamental  explanatory  variables  of
macroeconomic outcomes in developing countries was revisited by Calvo et. al. (1993)
who elucidated the resumption of international capital flows to Latin America in the early
nineties based on the role of external factors. More recently, business cycle models have
been extended to capture the role of external factors (Mendoza, 1995).  However, the
empirical literature has  mixed results  about the relative  importance of domestic  and
external factors as sources of output volatility.  On one hand, Hausman-Gavin (1995)
conclude  that  domestic  factors are  the  main  cause  of  output  volatility,  and  so  do
Hoffinaister and Roldos  (1997) and Ahmed  (1999)4.  On the  other hand,  Joyce  and
Kamas (1997) show that the relative importance of each factor varies with the country.
All these papers, except Ahmed's, have in common a sample period that covers, at the
most, until 1994.
The prevailing external environment during 1998 and 1999 was very unfavorable for the
region, as depicted by the evolution of regional terms of trade (Fig. 2) and the cost and
availability  of  external  financing 5 (Fig.  3  and  3A).  Additionally,  some  countries,
4 Kamin-Babson show that the probability of currency crises in Latin America is determined fundamentally
by internal  factors.  This  result  can  be interpreted  in favor  of  the  domestic  determinants  of  output  volatility,
given the association between currency crises and output growth.
'  As a proxy  for the cost of financing we include besides the real interest rate in the US, the non-Latin
Brady bond sovereign spreads  assuming it is completely exogenous to Latin America.  In the  following
section  we allow  for endogeneity  of the  spreads.  As a proxy  for  exogenous  capital  flows,  to describe  the
availability of external financing, we use the current account of industrialized countries.  In the last section
we discuss the inclusion of both price and quantity variables of this market.6
particularly  Ecuador and Peru, were negatively  affected  by the warming of the Pacific
Ocean  observed  in 1998,  caused  by "El Nifio"  (Fig.  4)6.
Figure  2
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6  The intensity  of  El  Niflo is  captured by  the  Southern Oscillation Index  (SQI),  obtained  from  the
Australian Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology. The SOI is based on the monthly seasonal fluctuations
in  the  air  pressure  difference between  Tahiti and  Darwin  Sustained negative  values of  the  Southern
Oscillation Index (SQL)  often indicate El Niflo episodes.7
Fig. 3A
Current  Account  In Industrial  Countries
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To measure the extent to which external developments accounted for the slowdown, we
estimated an equation relating output growth to its own lagged value and a set of external
factors 7,  using  a  dynamic panel  data  approach, estimated with  Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions (SUR)  methods.  This  approach has  several advantages: first,  it allows
derivation of  general conclusions with  respect to  the  impact of  external  factors  on
regional  output  fluctuations;  second, with  the  SUR  method  we  explicitly  take  into
account  "interdependence"  among the  countries in  the  group.  SUR  estimation  will
7 Listed in equation  (1): Terms of trade, US real interest rate, current account  balance  of industrialized
countries, non-Latin Brady bond sovereign spreads, and El Nino index.  Initially we included US GDP but
it turned out statistically insignificant. Ahmed (1999) gets similar results.8
increase efficiency given the expected contemporaneous correlation in the residuals of
8 each equation . Lastly, by pooling the data we minimize sample size problems.
The specification is as follows 9:
In  n  p  p  q
A4Y,  =  Z/, 1A4 Y,,4 +Za1A4 TO1I,,  +÷  JVUS1i,  ±S  +  CA1,  G  j +  L AjA 4SPD, j
/=1  ,j=0  j=0  1=0  j=O
+± )jISO, 1 +C,
.J=0
Where,
Y},:  Output
TOTit: Terms of Trade
USIi,:  US Federal Funds real interest rate.
CAIt:  Current Account Industrial Countries (millions of US dollars at 1996 prices).
SPDit: Non Latin lrady  Bond Sovereign spreads.
ISOit:  Southern Oscillation Index.
Cj:  Constant term.
And,
A 4:  year-over-year variation
Subscript i: ith country
Estimation results  (Appendix 1) show that  coefficients are significant and  with  the
expected sign: terms of trade improvements and better climatic condition (as measured by
the ISO index) have a positive effect on growth whereas higher external interest rates and
spreads have a negative effect, as does a lower availability of funds.
The estimated coefficients are then used to calculate 1998 and 1999 growth rates under
two  scenarios: Actual  (external variables take actual values) and  Constant  (assuming
external variables remain at their 1997 average level). That is, we estimate the N-step
forecast under these two alternative external conditions, and the difference between the
two is the effect of the external factors on growth. For the region as a whole, we calculate
that external factors account for 4.6 percentage points of the slowdown (Table 2, Col. 3).
To calculate the total slowdown we use two alternative procedures: one possibility is to
use the N-Step forecast using the actual conditions in the  external variables (Actual
scenario above); or, alternatively, we can use the most likely outcome for the year that
can be estimated given that we already have third quarter GDP data for most countries
8 Another reason to expect efficiency gains from the  SUR methodology arises because El Nino did not
affect all countries. Hence  the set of explanatory  variables  in the countries  not affected  by it is a subset  of
the explanatory  variables  included  for Peru and  Ecuador.
9 Initially, the specification did not include the current account in industrial countries.  Adding this variable
improved the explicatory power of the model and was used as the final specification.. US growth rate was
dropped out since it turned out to be not significant. This result coincides with Ahmed (1999).  However, it
might be the consequence of estimating a panel without allowing for slope heterogeneity.  A next revision
of this estimation should allow for this flexibility to verify this result.9
(this is closer to a  1-step forecast).  Both approaches lead to different figures: the total
slowdown between 1997 and 1999 ranged from 5.7% to 8.9% (Table 2). However the
conclusion is similar: a large part of the slowdown was due to the extemal conditions.
Given  that  external  factors  accounted for  4.6  percentage points,  52%  of  the  total
slowdown is explained by adverse external conditions; this ratio increases to 80% when
calculated with respect to the actual slowdown' 0.
The fact that the slowdown in regional output growth in 1998 and 1999 was driven to a
large extent by changes in the international environment should not lead to overlook the
role of internal factors in the economic performance of these countries.  The empirical
evidence presented here  does  not  take into  account political  or  economic domestic
developments. The following sections partly overcome this shortcoming by incorporating
domestic endogenous variables, such as real interest rates and real exchange rates, in
addition to the  exogenous factors considered in this section.
Table 2
Latin An. :rica  External Factors and GDP Growth
Slowdown'  1999-1997  Effect  of External
%  Shocks on 1998-99
Projected by  Growth 3
Actual  model 2 (%)
Argentina  -12.1  -10.8  -4.7
Brazil  -2.8  -7.6  -4.8
Chile  -8.6  -7.4  -5.1
Colombia  -7.5  -7.4  -4.9
Ecuador  -10.7  -8.2  -5.2
Mexico  -3.2  -10.3  -3.9
Peru  -4.2  -6.7  -4.9
Venezuela  -13.5  -12.5  -4.4
Weighted Average 4 -5.7  -8.9  -4.6
Weighted Average 4
(excluding Brazil, Mexico  -10.7  -9.9  -4.8
and Peru)
'Slowdown calculated as the difference between 1999 and 1997 growth rates.
2 N-step ahead forecast.
Calculated as the difference between the 1999 N-step ahead forecast using actual
external conditions and the 1999 N-Step ahead forecast using 1997 average
conditions.
4Weighted  by 1997 GDP.
°  The 52% figure is a lower bound, since a dynamic panel that neglects slope heterogeneity (like we did)
leads to underestimation of the  regressor coefficients, other than the lagged dependent variable (Pesaran
and Smith, (1995), Haque, Pesaran and Sarma, (1999)).  If these coefficients are biased downward, then we
underestimate the importance of the changes in external conditions which are the regressors whose value
we are changing.10
III. Country-Specific Analysis: The Role of External and Domestic Factors on
Output Variability during 1992-1998
In this section we examine, on an individual basis for the same set of eight countries, the
relationship between output, external capital markets, TOT, real interest rates and real
exchange rates during the period 1992-1998.  The central objective is to determine the
sources of  output volatility  during  this  period and  to  describe  output's  response  to
historical shocks in the rest of the variables. To do so, we estimated individual VAR
models following the methodology proposed by Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996).  The
first part of the section briefly describes the evolution of the main variables for each
country.  The  second  part  summarizes  the  main  points  of  the  Generalized  VAR
methodology. The third part presents the results.
A.  Behavior of the main variables during the 1992-1999 period
1) External Factors
The terms of trade during this period showed a downward trend, aggravated by the Asian
crisis  that  compressed commodity demand  worldwide.  Fig.  5  shows  for  individual
countries the terms of trade during the period.
Fig. 5a
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Capital flows to the region were also disrupted.  The indicator we used, the sovereign
spreads of Brady bonds (Figure 6 )11,  shows that recovery after the Tequila shock was
1 The Brady Bond sovereign spreads are available for the whole sample period only for Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico.  For the other countries we used the Latin American aggregate (LATEMBI), from JP Morgan.11
halted first by the Asian crisis of late  1997 and then by the Russian crisis of August-
September of 1998.
Fig. 5b
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The real exchange rate had diverse behavior across countries (Figure  7).  Argentina's
and Mexico's REER had similar trends: first it appreciated until 1994, then it depreciated
until 1996, and finally resumed the appreciating trend. In Brazil, Chile and Colombia the
trend was an appreciating one until mid or late  1997 when a depreciating trend began.
The policy settings were widely different: on one extreme Argentina with its fixed - rate12
convertibility system, and on the other Mexico with a very flexible exchange rate.  In the
midst we had a combination of rigid bands such as the Brazilian and Chilean, while the
Colombian  system  was  one  of  "adjustable  bands"  modified  on  several  occasions,
downward until 1996 and then upward.  All the countries experienced less volatility in
the real exchange rate during 1997-1998 (Appendix 3).
Fig. 7a
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The behavior of real interest rates during the whole period is diverse (Figure 8). In Brazil
and  Argentina this  variable is very  volatile at the  beginning and  then stabilizes.  In
Colombia  and  Chile an  opposite pattern  is  observed: volatility  follows a  period  of13
stability.  However,  all the countries  show a rise of interest rates  in the  1997-1998  period,
even though  volatility  fell in most of them, except  Colombia  (Appendix  3).
Fig 8
Real  Interest  Rates  1992-1999
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B. Methodology' 2
Given  the potential  endogeneity  of all the variables  and the lags with  which  they  interact,
we  estimated  a  VAR  model  for  each  country.  We  use  the  Generalized  VAR  (GVAR)
methodology  (Koop,  Pesaran,  and  Potter  (KPP)(1996))  recently  applied  to  study  the
impact  of  financial  contagion  on  output  in  Argentina  (Agenor,  Aizenman  and
Hoffmaister,  1999). Appendix  2 briefly  describes  the methodology,  highlighting  the main
differences  with traditional  VAR analysis.
12 This section follows closely the work by Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) and  Pesaran and Shin (1998).
The reader familiarized with this literature can skip the section without any loss of continuity.14
KPP reconsider VAR analysis around two facts: a) shocks to different variable are not
independent b)  shocks are  correlated across time'3. These two  issues led them  to
examine system-wide shocks (as  opposed to  variable-specific) and to  deal  in  some
manner with future shocks given their autocorrelation.  The way they did this was by
means of the expectations operator conditional on history and/or shock.  The constructed
response averages out future shocks, hence it is an average of what might happen in the
future given the past and present.
The key features of the Generalized Impulse Response analysis are: a) Impulse response
functions and variance decompositions are independent of the ordering of the variables
(compositional problem) or  any other a-priori restrictions  on the variance-covariance
matrix of the reduced form residuals b). The analysis describes how the system behaves
after a specific historical shock, taking into consideration the correlation among shocks.
Since historical shocks are not orthogonal, they do not add up to 1  00%.
D.  Results  for  1992-1998:  Generalized Variance  Decomposition of  Output  and
Impulse-Response Functions
The country-specific GVAR models were estimated using monthly data for the same set
of  five  variables  (industrial  output  growth, real  interest  rates,  real  exchange  rates,
sovereign  spreads  and  terms  of  trade14)  during  the  period  1992-1998.  To  capture
international capital markets dynamics we used the Brady Bonds sovereign spread and if
the country did  not have one the regional average was used.  Appendix 3 contains a
detailed description and source of each variable).
The lag-selection  process  was  done  with  different  information criteria.  The Akaike
criterion yielded almost always twelve lags, while the Schwarz criterion pointed at lag
one.  The likelihood ratio test between the two orders indicated that the longer lag length
was preferable'5. (Appendix 3 presents a summary of the VAR estimates for each country
and the coefficient of variation of each of the variables during the sample period.
The generalized variance decomposition of output in the eight countries shows (Table 3)
that these variables explain fairly well the forecast error variance of output during this
"  They consider  a third issue  which  is the state of the system  prior to the shock  and afterwards,  but we do
not examine  this complication  here since  it applies  only  to non-linear  systems.
14 Many variables  are excluded  mainly because  of sample size limitations. One of the most obvious
exclusions is US output growth, that in the first section tumed out to be statistically  insignificant. In
Mexico's case there is a very close relationship between industrial production in both countries.  However,
when you include US industrial output in Mexico's VAR very undesirable results emerge: after shocking
the TOT, output diverges from stationary levels: the same thing happens when the spreads  are shocked.
More work is needed in this topic.  Another omitted variable is the quantity variable, or the capital flows,
but the last section of the paper discusses this issue in more detail.
'5  The only exception was Argentina where 8 lags were used because of data limitations.  The variables
were  differenced to achieve stationarity, hence our  analysis does  not incorporate potential  restrictions
imposed by long-run relationships among the non-stationary variables.  Again, the main obstacle was the
sample size to perform the type of cointegrated VAR analysis done by Ahmed (1999).15
sample period 16. In most countries, the "own" shocks to output explain between 8% and
40% of  output's  error  variance, implying that  60% or  more of  output variability  is
explained by shocks to the terms of trade, to external spreads, to the real interest rate and
to  the real  exchange rate.  Only in  Venezuela and  Peru  is  a  substantial percentage
(between 55% and 60%) of output variability left unexplained by these factors.  These
countries are the most volatile in the Hausman-Gavin (1995) paper on volatility in Latin
America, where the authors find that in these two countries a good part of GDP volatility
is explained by policy variability, financial deepening and political volatility'7.
Output's  "own  shocks" capture effects from unidentified variables outside the model.
They are, partly, the result of the a-priori marginalization process in which the researcher
chooses the specific set of variables whose interaction will be studied. These, however,
might be external or internal. These results (Table 3)show that the variance explained by
external variables is less than the variance accounted for by the internal factors, except in
Argentina  If the own shocks to output are classified as reflecting mainly the effect of
omitted internal factors, the relative importance shifts even more towards the domestic
Table 3
Generalized Variance Decomposition of  Industrial Output- Argentina
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  5  10  4  11  90
4  11  37  18  13  69
8  15  54  27  15  49
12  15  59  21  18  46
16  14  53  22  22  41
20  14  51  26  22  39
24  14  54  27  21  38
Generalized  Variance Decomposition of Industrial Output- Brazil
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  4  6  12  3  77
4  4  32  10  59  30
8  4  31  14  77  11
12  4  41  10  74  9
16  4  47  10  68  8
20  5  48  11  62  8
24  5  48  12  61  8
16 We will use the terms forecast error variance of output and output variability interchangeably. The same
with the other variables of the model. In Appendix 3 you can see the main statistics of the VAR estimates
of each equation. You can see that the R 2 for the output equations are quite good for most countries.
17 See Table 14 of the second part Annual Report, 1995, IADB.16
Table 3- Continued
Generalized Variance Decomposition of Industrial  Output- Mexico
Horizon  Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
(in  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic Real  Real  Output
months)  Trade  Interest Rate  Exchange
Rate
1  5  1  2  4  96
4  6  12  5  12  73
8  5  39  22  43  36
12  4  57  37  59  24
16  3  56  41  61  25
20  4  50  39  56  26
24  4  49  37  54  25
Generalized Variance Decomposition of Industrial Output- Chile
Horizon  Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
(in  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic Real  Real  Output
months)  Trade  Interest Rate  Exchange
Rate
1  3  3  13  0  90
4  4  13  25  8  62
8  3  23  25  18  47
12  6  24  27  16  43
16  7  25  28  16  40
20  7  25  28  16  39
24  7  25  29  16  39
Table 3 (Continued)
Generalized Variance Decomposition of Industrial Output- Colombia
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  12  2  23  18  79
4  16  2  28  22  59
8  22  9  35  26  49
12  19  12  47  26  38
16  18  18  48  28  30
20  18  21  43  30  27
24  17  23  41  30  26
Generalized Variance Decomposition of Industrial Output- Peru
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  14  3  1  6  95
4  17  4  12  6  81
8  17  6  13  6  77
12  28  13  11  13  60
16  27  12  12  13  59
20  30  13  11  13  55
24  30  12  10  11  5617
Generalized Variance Decomposition of Industrial Output- Venezuela
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  10  7  2  7  88
4  19  5  19  11  65
8  29  8  20  20  50
12  27  14  16  17  54
16  21  14  13  13  62
20  18  13  15  11  62
24  17  13  16  11  60
Generalized Variance Decomposition of Industrial Output- Ecuador
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  11  3  9  3  99
4  35  3  7  6  82
8  36  13  6  12  62
12  30  17  17  15  55
16  34  17  17  13  44
20  28  14  14  13  35
24  24  14  26  17  34
factors as being the main sources of output variability 18. This last classification does not
seem  unreasonable,  given  that  we  omitted  nominal  variables  and  fiscal  policy  variables
which might have been important determinants of  short run output fluctuations 19 These
results are in line with those reported by Hausman-Gavin (1995), Hoffmaister- Roldos
(1997), and Ahmed (1999) according to which domestic factors were the main sources of
output variability in Latin America, even though our sample period and data  sets are
different.
As  expected, growth rates react  differently to  similar  shocks across countries.  For
example, shocks to the external capital markets play a major role explaining the variance
of  output  growth  in Brazil,  Mexico  and  Argentina,  while  in  Venezuela  they  are  the  least
important factor with an almost negligible effect: in Brazil, Argentina  and Mexico these
innovations explain about fifty percent (50%) of output variance, while in Venezuela they
account for less than 15%.  This is a reasonable result given Venezuela's  low external
financing requirements.  Colombia, and Chile are intermediate cases where there  are
other dominant factors that account for output variance.
1  The approach of associating "own" output shocks with domestic factors, common in the literature, has
been criticized by Kamin and Babson (1999).
'9 The reason for not having included nominal variables are a combination of a) Results of previous papers,
such as the Hausman-Gavin (HG) and Hoffinaister-Roldos (HR) in which nominal shocks are absent (HG)
or their effects are on output variability is small (HR). b) Data availability imposed degrees of freedom
restrictions, limiting the option of including additional variables.18
To quantify the effect of external spreads shocks on output, we estimated the following
multipliers 20 based on the impulse response functions (Appendix 4):  In Argentina, a one-
standard deviation shock has an immediate impact on growth, producing a slowdown of
3% on average that  lasts about 10 months.  This result is similar to that  obtained by
Agenor, Aizenman and Hoffmaister (1999), though their effect is more persistent (15
months) but of smaller magnitude (about 0.5% on average). In Brazil, a shock of similar
magnitude implies a  slowdown of  1.4%, but of  greater persistence (21 months).  In
Mexico, a one-standard deviation shock reflects in a growth-slowdown on average of
1.6% and has an effect that lasts  18 months.  In Chile, the same sized shock reduces
growth by 1.1%. and its effect disappears after 15 months.  In Colombia, a similar shock
produces a slowdown of about 0.4% but persists around 18 months.
Domestic real interest rate shocks are a major source of output variability in Chile and
Colombia. In Chile, a one-standard deviation shock to real interest rates is associated
with a slowdown of  1.3% on average that lasts a bit over a year.  In Colombia, a similar
shock results in  lower growth of  1.4% that lasts about 16 months.  In  Brazil a  one
standard deviation shock to the real interest rate is associated with lower growth of .9%21
during nine months.  In Argentina, a one-percentage point shock lowers growth by about
2% during seven months.  In Mexico a similar shock lowers growth by 0.6% during 17
months.
The real exchange rate shocks are the main explanatory factor of output growth variance
in Brazil and Mexico. In Argentina, Chile, and Colombia it's  the second or third most
important  factor  accounting for the  variance of  output. In  every  case the  impulse-
response functions shows (Appendix 4) that real exchange rate-appreciating shocks are
associated with output expansions.  The negative association between output growth and
currency depreciation  in the  short run  (we used a  24-month horizon) is  common to
previous studies abouL  this topic in Latin America (Edwards, 1989; Kamin and Rogers,
1997, Ahmed,  1999)22
Terms of trade shocks are the dominant source of output variability in Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela (in the 8-16 months horizon), though, as mentioned before, a major part of the
forecast error variance remains unexplained by our model in the last two countries. In
20  These multipliers are the average values of the impulse response functions from the moment of the shock
until its persistence  lasts. Appendix  4 presents  the impulse  response  functions.
21 The relatively small number is due to the fact that real interest rates have a huge variability in Brazil.
One standard deviation shock is a 24 percentage point shock that reduces growth in 0.9%.  In Chile, a one
standard deviation shock (3.4 percentage points) reduces growth  by 1.3%. This comment applies to all the
multipliers we are describing in this section and in Appendix 4 you can see the magnitudes of one standard
deviation shocks for each series.
22  The  VAR including the  rate of growth of output and the real exchange rate in differences has  the
problem  of  not  incorporating  restrictions  imposed by  possible  long-term relationships  between  the
variables. Ahmed  (1999) used  a  cointegrating VAR methodology for  a  different  sample  period  and
different variables, but the results are similar to those reported here. Unfortunately, our sample size and the
lag-lengths we selected do not allow similar estimations, forcing us to interpret our results as applicable to
the short run. Kamin-Klau (1998) proposed an alternative methodology for  incorporating the  long-run
relationship, and for a subset of Latin American countries find that the contractionary effect does not hold
in the long-run.19
Argentina and Colombia the TOT shocks have an effect of intermediate significance,
while they appear relatively unimportant in Brazil, Chile and Mexico. From the impulse-
response functions (Appendix 4), the following multipliers can be obtained: In Argentina,
a one standard deviation shock in the index will raise growth by 1.3% during twelve
months.  In Brazil a similar shock will increase growth by 0.2% during 18 months.  In
Chile a one standard deviation shock in the terms of trade variable increases growth 0.3%
during 17 months.  In Colombia, a shock of similar size raises growth by 0.4% during 21
months, while in Mexico it raises growth by 0.2% during two years.
Table 4 summarizes the sensitivity of output growth to shocks in different variables, as
well as the persistence of the shocks in each of the five countries under consideration.
This information was calculated on the average behavior of the system for the sample
period 1992-1998 and will be used in the next section to examine 1998-1999 in more
detail.
IV.  The Role of External and Domestic Factors on the 1998/1999 Slowdown
In  this  section we  aim  at  accounting for  the  1998-1999 slowdown  in  a  sub-set  of
economies of the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico). Based on the
generalized impulse response functions estimated for the whole period and the shocks
that took place during  1997-1999, we calculate approximately the importance of each
variable explaining growth rate changes during 1998 and 1999.
Table  4
Sensitivity of Industrial Output Growth to shocks and persistence of the effects
Average change in output growth due to a historical one standard deviation shock in:
TOT  Spreads  Real Interest rates  Real Exchange
Rates
Argentina  1.3  3.0  2.0  1.5
Brazil  0.2  1.4  0.9  1.0
Chile  0.3  1.1  1.3  0.6
Colombia  0.4  0.4  1.4  0.6
Mexico  0.2  1.6  0.6  1.2
Persistence (in number  of months) on output growth after a shock to:
TOT  Spreads  Real Interest rates  Real Exchange
Argentina  12  10  1  7  18
Brazil  18  21  9  12
Chile  17  15  13  15
Colombia  21  18  16  18
Mexico  24  18  17  24
Table 5 summarizes the evolution of the original variables during this sub-period.  The
identification of  shocks, their timing  and measurement is a  difficult task  due  to  the
endogeneity of all the variables.  To account for all the interaction between the variables
we used the VAR to forecast the variables and then compared the forecasted value with
the observed one. The discrepancy between the forecasted value and the observed one20
was  considered a  shock if  it exceeded two  standard errors  of the respective VAR
equation (Appendix 2 shows the SE of each equation).  Initially the VAR was estimated
with  data up to  1996 and the whole set of variables was forecasted for the first three
months of 1997. Then, the VAR was re-estimated with data up to the first quarter of 1997
to forecast the second three months for 1997.  This procedure was repeated recursively
for each quarter until June, 1999.
Table 5
Yearly Average Values of Different Variables 1997-1999*
Terms of Trade  Spreads  Domestic real  Real exchange  Industrial
Index  (basis points)  Interest rates  Rate Index  Output Growth
(%/0)  Rate
________  ~  (%)
Brazil  97  95  451  17.9  118  4.0
98  94  822  26.3  116  -2.0
99  79  1197  29.5  82  -3.3
Argentina 97  95  438  6.8  169  14.4
98  89  677  6.0  174  2.2
99  74  845  7.1  177  -9.9
Mexico  97  50  419  3.3  109  9.3
98  47  696  7.6  111  6.7
99  47  841  7.1  119  3.3
Chile  97  14  447  5.7  135  4.0
98  10  778  10.5  133  -1.0
99  9  1063  4.9  129  -4.2
Colombia 97  125  447  11  161  2.5
98  113  778  21.8  155  -1.0
99  104  1063  16.8  148  -18.0
*First semester averages for 1999
With  the  positive  and  negative  shocks identified in  this  fashion 23,  and  the  impact
multipliers and the persistence information described by the impulse response functions,
we estimated the most probable effects of the historical shocks on output growth.
The net effects of the identified shocks with the models (Tables 6 and 7) show that during
1998, in Argentina and Mexico the main contractionary effect came from the external
factors.  In Brazil the importance was balanced between external and domestic factors,
while  for  Chile  and  Colombia  internal  factors  were  the  dominant  forces  exerting
downward pressure.  In 1999, the main slowing effect came from the external factors for
all countries.
23 Appendix 5 contains the  list of the estimated shocks, and a summary of their description. To simplify
matters, we considered  the observed changes in the TOT as the magnitude of the shock. This is equivalent
as considering the TOT as a completely exogenous variable.  If  two shocks of the same sign occurred
within the  same quarter, only one was considered to allow for possible correlation of  the  shocks. For
descriptive purposes, we present the average size of the shocks for each variable in each country during
1997-1999 (Appendix 5).21
Table 6
Net Effects of Shocks
1998
Terms of Trade  Spread  Rel  Interest  RFFR
Argentina  -3.7  -5.0  -2.0  -4.5
Brazil  -0.4  -3.0  -2.3  -1.1
Chile  -1.0  -0.6  -3.1  -1.0
Colombia  -0.5  -0.8  -5.2  -2.1
Mexico  -4-2  -2-9  -0-3  2 5
Table 7
Net Effects of Shocks
1999
Terms  of  Trade  Spread  Real  Interest  REER
Argentina  -7.0  -2.4  -2.2  -1.5
Brazil  -1.3  -4.7  -1.5  -0.8
Chile  -1.7  -3.0  1.3  -2.4
Colombia  -0.8  -2.7  0.1  -4.9
Mexico  -3.1  -2.1  -2.8  3.6
For the whole period 1998-1999 (Table 8), this methodology  predicted big falls in output
growth rates in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. This actually happened in Argentina and
Colombia.  Similarly, in those countries where the method predicted the smallest falls,
these took place.  In general the forecast error is not very big as a percentage of the
forecasted value, except in Brazil and Mexico. In both cases the observed slowdown was22
significantly smaller than the forecasted one. This result is similar to that reported in the
quarterly GDP exercise in the first section (Table 2), where these two countries defy the
model's  forecasting ability.  In Mexico's  case, the omission of US output is definitely
related to this outcome and points at the need of further working on this issue.
Table 8
Predictions for  1998-1999 and observed changes in industrial output growth rates
(1)  (2)  (3)
Predicted total  Observed changes  Effects of
effect of shocks  in industrial  output  unidentified shocks
1998-1999  growth rates
Argentina  -28.3  -24.3  +4.0
Brazil  -15.1  -7.3  +8.5
Chile  -9.5  -8.2  +1.3
Colombia  -16.9  -20.5  -3.6
Mexico  -9.3  -6.0  +3.3
(1) Sum of the net effects of tables 7and 8 for each country
(2) Difference of the average growth rates for 1999 and 1997 from Table 4.
(3) (2)-(1)
To evaluate the relative importance of external factors vis-a-vis the domestic ones, we
compute the ratio of the net effects of the external variables to the total predicted effect of
the shocks.  Due to the differences between the predicted change and the observed value,
the ratio of the net external effects to the observed change in output growth was also
computed.  In all the countries, except Colombia, the ratios are well above .5 (Table 9),
pointing at the importance of external factors explaining output fluctuations in the sub-
period 1998-1999.
Table 9
Effects of external factors on growth as a ratio of the total predicted changes and the
observed changes in output growth
External effects/Total  External  effects/  Observed
predicted effects  changes
Argentina  .64  .74
Brazil  .62  1.29
Chile  .66  .77
Colombia  .28  .23
Mexico  1.3  2.1
These results coincide with those obtained from the panel exercise with quarterly GDP
(Table 2), according to which about 50% of the observed regional slowdown in  1998-
1999 was due to external effects.  Colombia is the country where the slowdown is less
related to the external factors (Table 9).  Brazil and Mexico, in contrast, seem to be the
more affected by external shocks. These results support the Joyce-Kamas (1997) study of
Mexico and Colombia where they conclude that external factors are the main source of23
output volatility in the first country while the opposite holds for the second one.  Most
importantly, both results point at the difficulty of generalizing on a  single dominant
source of output volatility.
The crucial result emerging from this section is that a large share of the slowdown was
due  to  external effects, while for the whole period  1992-1998 we had  obtained  that
domestic factors were the main  sources of output volatility.  This  difference can be
explained not only because of the severity' of the external shocks that took place in the
latter part of the decade, but also because the region managed to achieve stability in key
24 variables that were previously noisy factors in the growth process  . Some suggestive
statistics (Appendix 3) show that real exchange rates and real interest rates were  less
volatile25 in the period 1997-1998, than in the previous five years; external variables, on
the other hand, were more volatile during the second sub-sample.
V.  Other issues for further research
a)  On the use of  sovereign spreads to  capture the effects of  international financing
shocks
Between 30% and 70% of the variability of external spreads (Appendix 6) is explained by
own shocks, implying that the other variables account for a non-negligible portion of the
variance.  In Argentina, shocks to  real interest rates and to the terms of trade jointly
account for a similar fraction as the own shocks explaining external spread variability.
This result differs from that of Agenor, Aizenman and Hoffmaister (1999) where shocks
to other variables account for a minimal fraction of the variance of the external spreads.
Appendix 6 shows the factors that explain spread variability in each of the countries.
The  possibility  exists  that  the  spreads  don't  capture  correctly  the  happenings  in
international credit markets 26. This would be the case if credit rationing took place in this
market, implying that a quantity variable should be used.  To examine this hypothesis, we
constructed a monthly proxy of capital flows in each country by taking the sum of the
24 The possibility  of a shift  in the relative  importance  between  domestic  and external  factors  accounting  for
currency crisis in Latin countries is hinted by Kamin and Babson (1999) in their conclusion.
25 Volatility measured by the coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean). More analysis on these
issues is needed, for example, on the measurement of volatility with GARCH models.
26  The hypothesis that our spreads variable could not be reflecting adequately the international financial
markets conditions emerged after we did some ex-post model specification intuitive or suggestive testing
consisting in taking the forecast error (difference between the actual value and the forecasted one) for each
country and correlating it with variables that had been omitted mainly because of sample size limitations or
because the infornation  didn't  exist with monthly frequency, but for which we had yearly data.  Such is
the case of  government spending, fiscal deficit, private credit growth as a  fraction of GDP, the current
account balance and other variables (Appendix 7).  The rank correlation exercise shows that there is no
systematic relationship between the forecast errors and any of these omitted variables.  However, the only
systematic relationship emerged between the forecast error and the lagged values of the  current account
hinting at the possibility that our external financing we had used was inappropriate.  This is the subject of
the next few paragraphs and Appendix 8.24
(negative of)  the trade balance and the change in  international reserves27.  In some
countries, like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico a strong negative correlation between the
spreads and the capital flows proxy was obtained (Fig 9). That is when capital flows in,
spreads go down or vice-versa.  If this were always the case, then either of the variables
could be used and the quantity variable would have no additional information.
Fig. 9
Capital Flows and Spreads in Some Latin American Countries
(normalized data)
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To verify  statistically this hypothesis we adopted two alternative approaches: first, we
verified the nested hypothesis that a more general model (including both the spreads and
capital flows) was not selected over a restricted model (including spreads or capital flows
27  Ideally we should have used the  capital account of the balance of payments, or the current account.
However no monthly  information exists for these variables, so we used the  described indicator.  The
indicator was the smoothed with a six-month moving average for the graphs presented in the text.25
only).  Second, we used some non-nested tests to select between "competing" models:  a
spreads only model vs. a flows only one.  Appendix 7 presents  details of the model
selection procedures, but we find no compelling evidence for the more general model,
except for the cases of Colombia and Mexico, and probably in Brazil. Future versions of
this paper that allow for different specifications should take this into consideration.
b)  What Accounts for Real Interest Rate Variability ?
Looking at the real interest rate variance decomposition (Appendix 6), several things are
worth  noting.  First, this  set  of variables explains reasonably well real  interest  rate
variability in the sample countries. In Argentina, Mexico and Peru, shocks to the external
capital  markets  (external spreads) were  the main  factor explaining real  interest  rate
variability.
The second most common source of  real interest rate variability was the real exchange
rate.  While in Argentina the importance of this variable quickly fades away, in Mexico,
Peru and Brazil its relative weight is stable and of significant magnitude.
In Chile and Colombia the "own" shocks to interest rates are the most important factor
explaining interest rate variability.  In these two cases, this variable can be considered
largely exogenous with respect to the rest of the variables in the model. This  finding
might be related to the fact that these two countries imposed some type of capital controls
during this period.
c)  Determinants of Real Exchange Rate Variability
Variance  decomposition  of  real  exchange  rates  (Appendix  6)  shows  that  in  most
countries,  shocks to  the  external capital markets  are the  main  explanatory variable
(besides the  own shocks) of real  exchange rate  variability.  This  contrasts with  the
Roldos-Hoffmaister (1997) result according to  which  domestic  shocks are the  main
drivers of real exchange rate variability.
VI. Conclusions
Based  on  the  country-specific Generalized Variance  Decompositions  we  found  that
during  1992-1998 output variability in most Latin American countries was associated
with domestic factors. These results coincide with other work (Hausman-Gavin (1995),
Hoffmaister-Roldos (1997) and Ahmed (1999).  In four of the eight countries (Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico) the joint effect of shocks to domestic factors (real interest rates
and real exchange rates) on output variability was greater than the combined effect of
shocks to external variables (terms of trade and external spreads). In Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico, shocks to external spreads played a major role, while in Chile and Colombia
real  interest  rates  shocks were  the  principal sources  of  output  variability.  In  the
remaining three countries, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela,  terms of trade  shocks were26
dominant sources of output variability, but a significant proportion of output variability is
explained by output's own shocks, or remains to be explained.
However, explaining the 1998-1999 slowdown a different picture emerged: In the panel
exercise we found that, for the region as a whole, at least 50% of the slowdown was
attributable to the adverse external conditions.  In the country-specific analysis we found
that in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico shocks to the terms of trade and external
spreads account for at least 60% of the slowdown, while in Colombia internal factors
played the major role.
The results  according to  which  domestic factors explain the  largest share  of  output
variability during the whole sample period, but external factors account for the largest
share of the 1998-1999 slowdown can be reconciled given the severity of the external
shocks registered in the last part of the decade and that the countries managed to reduce
real exchange rate and real interest rate volatility during the last two years of our sample.
The fact that external factors account for such a large share of the regional slowdown
cannot be interpreted as a denial of the role that economic policy might play.  Precisely
the opposite.  The shift in  relative importance between external and domestic factors
explaining  output  fluctuations can  be  thought  of  as  an  achievement  of  economic
management in most of the countries in the latter part of the decade.  More research is
needed on the determinants of real interest rates and exchange rates in the region.
These results might be useful in the debate over the appropriate exchange rate regime, if
we stretch them to associate external shocks (terms of trade and external spreads) with
real shocks. Then a very basic model in which agents have no big liabilities denominated
in foreign currency would indicate that in the face of adverse external shocks a relative
price adjustment will reduce output volatility.  Considering this benchmark case, then
Brazil and Mexico, where external shocks explained the biggest part of the slowdown,
made the right  choice of adopting a more flexible exchange rate  in terms of  output
stabilization.  Coincidentally, these two countries were the ones in which both of our
models predicted bigger slowdowns than those actually observed.
The importance of terms of trade shocks accounting for output volatility during the whole
period 1992-1998 in a group of countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru) and
the major role these shocks played in the 1998-1999 slowdown in some others (Argentina
and  Chile) points at the need of making important gains  in the area  of stabilization
mechanisms. Hausman-Gavin (1995) pointed at some problems with existing schemes in
the region.  A matter that deserves some attention is related with the funding of such
schemes if the falls in  commodity prices are of permanent nature or long persistence
(Cashin, Liang and Mc Dermott, 1999).  Alternative risk-hedging instruments must be
devised, such as  commodity-price indexed debt instrument would have the desirable
property of the country paying less in bad times and more in good times. Probably they
are not widely used by the countries of the region because they might be more costly, but
episodes as those of 1998-1999 show they might be insurance worth its price.
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Appendix 1- Panel Estimation Results
A) External Factors and GDP Growth.- Panel Estimation Results.
Table 1: Exogenous Factors and GDP Growth 1992-1997
Panel Regression
Sample: 1992:01 1997:4
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic
A4Y 1 0.632  14.041 (*)
A4Y4 -0.452  -9.703 (*)
A4Y. 5 0.261  5.584 (*)
A4TOT  0.040  8.323 (*)
A4TOT4 0.042  6.592 (*)
USI- 2 -0.006  -5.647 (*)
CAL2 0.0003  1.963 (**)
A4SPD- 3 -0.010  -3.477 (*)
1S04 0.001  3.848 (*)
Fixed Effects
Argentina  0.035
Brazil  0.026
Chile  0.055
Colombia  0.027
Ecuador  0.026
Mexico  0.026
Peru  0.052
Venezuela  0.022
R2  0.744  Mean dependent var  0.044
R  adjusted  0.713  S.D. dependent var  0.042
S.E. of regression  0.023  Sum squared resid  0.068
Durbin-Watson  1.69
(*) Significant at 1%. (**) Significant at 10%.
B) Methodology
To quantify the effect of the external factors on the decline in output growth observed in 1998 and  1999,
we followed a two step procedure:
First Step: Estimate (1) for the period 1992-1997. Results of the estimation are in Table 1.
Second Step:  With the resulting coefficients we forecast 1998 and 1999 growth rates under two scenarios:
a) actual values for external conditions are used in the forecast; b) 'constant external environment'.  That is,
forecast 1998 and  1999 assuming that terms of trade, interest rates, non-Latin spreads, current account in
industrial countries, and El Nifno factor take the average value observed in 1997.  We use N-Step ahead
forecasts.30
Table 2: External Factors and GDP Growth 1992-1999
Sample: 1992:1 1999:3
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic
A4Yl  0.741  18.955 (*)
A4Y4 -0.446  -8.530 (*)
A4Y5 0.263  5.428 (*)
A4TOT  0.038  6.155 (*)
A4TOT4 0.040  5.235 (*)
USI  -0.005  -6.259 (*)
CAI,  0.0004  2.984 (*)
A4SPD- 3 -0.010  -5.491 (*)
ISO. 4 0.0004  4.222 (*)
Fixed Effects
Argentina  0.029
Brazil  0.024
Chile  0.042
Colombia  0.021
Ecuador  0.021
Mexico  0.029
Peru  0.040
Venezuela  0.020
0.800  Mean dependent var  0.032
R2 adjusted  0.783  S.D. dependent var  0.047
S.E. of regression  0.022  Sum squared resid  0.092
Durbin-Watson  1.839
(*) Significant at 1%.
Appendix 2
Description of the GVAR methodology
To  give  any  economic  interpretation  to  estimated  VAR,  traditional  analysis  revolved  around  the
identification  problem.  Different analysts  imposed various  types  of  restrictions  on  the  reduced  form
estimates  of the  VAR to  recover the  shocks of  a  structural model.  Many  altematives to  restrict the
variance-covariance matrix of the errors of the reduced form estimates exist (i.e. Sims(1986), Bemanke
(1986),  Blanchard-Quah (1989)),  but the  most  common ones  use  a  Cholesky decomposition and/or
particular economic models to restrict this matrix 2 8.  All of the above seek to recover a primitive set of
structural shocks that are assumed to be independent and serially uncorrelated
Once  these  structural  shocks  are  recovered, the  impulse response functions  can be  interpreted in  a
meaningful way.  The traditional impulse response analysis estimates the effects of a  shock of  size  J
affecting the system at time t on the system's state at time t+n without any other shocks taking place during
28 Canova (1995) has an excellent overview of VAR analysis and the multiple ways researchers deal with
the identification problem.31
the transition.  This estimation is performed by comparing two realizations of the system: one in which the
system is shocked by  a  variable-specific shock (all  other shocks are  "turned off')  and  the  other one
(benchmark case) in which no shocks affect the system. In this setting of orthogonal shocks, the variance
decomposition (defined as the proportion of the n-step ahead forecast error variance of variable i which is
accounted for by innovations in variable j in the VAR) adds up to 100%.
The traditional impulse response is:
ly (n,  8,  0  t-1) = E (Y t+n  /  V,  8  , V  ,,,=O,  ...  V,n=,  Co t-l)  - E (Y t+n  / Vt=0,  V tl=0',  Vt.
= 0,  t-l)
o)  is the set of information
In the case of a multivariate linear system, such as the one we examine the impulse response function has
the following form.
Consider a multivariate linear system Y t=  AY t-I  +  V t
Where V t -N(0,  E  )
Under very mild assumptions, the system has an infinite moving average representation,
Y,  =  Ai V_j
nxl  li=o  i  iiixm  IX
For this case, the impulse response function is:
I y(n,  5,  ct,-,)  =E  YtnV=  i5  ,  co  t-)E  (Y,,n  /  t-l)
=A  5
Recall V is a vector of shocks and 8  (the size of the shock) is 8  =(  8  1, 8  2,  3,  4...  m)'.  Hence, the
impulse response function depends on the composition of the shocks.
The choice of the particular vector of shocks, 8,  can be done several ways.  One of them is by means of
the Cholesky decomposition of Z,  , such that: TT'=  1Z  , such that the shocks are orthogonalized. (  8  =T"V)
The effect of a unit shock at time t to the ith orthogonalized error 8i, , on the kth variable at time t+N is
given by:
'IVj  = e  AN Tej  i, k =  1,2,  ...,  m
where ek (e,) is a selection vector with its kth (ith) element equal to unity and zeroes elsewhere.
The matrix T in the orthogonal IR function is of the form:
I1l,2  o  o 
T=  cr22&12  ...  O|
W  re  the2  0i  s  t  a  r  s  e  o  n  n  r
Where the  - sign indicates that the  variance corresponds to the  transformed innovation vector  T-'Vt.
Therefore, any alteration in the  ordering will usually result in a different impulse responses for the  kth
variable.32
KPP reconsider VAR analysis around two facts: a) shocks to different variable  are not  independent b)
shocks are correlated across time 29. The treatment of these two issues led them to examine system-wide
shocks  (as opposed  to variable-specific) and to  deal in  some manner with  future shocks  given  their
autocorrelation.  The way they did this was by means of the expectations operator conditional on history
and/or shock.  The constructed response averages out future shocks, hence it is an average of what might
happen in the future given the past and present.
KPP's approach to avoid the composition problem is to fix one shock (one element of 35  ) and integrating
out the effects of other shocks using an assumed distribution of the errors or the historically observed one.
In the linear case the distribution of the GI can be obtained from the distribution of  Vt.  If Vt - N(0,  E  ),
then GI -N(0, A E  A').  The variances along the diagonal of An E  An' measure the effect of shocking the
system and then averaging the squares of the GI component by component against the joint distribution of
the system-wide shocks.
The generalized impulse response for the kth variable will be
GIRIk,N  =  ekAN  XEe,  i, k = 1,2,..  m
Where E is the variance-covariance  matrix of the original error vector V,, that is:
E = E(V,V,),
that is,
Lc11  t  .12  ..  O'1.
*' 2 2 --
m.
cr,l  ...  ...  L7nim,
So the GIR is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VAR.
KPP  show that  in the  case where the vector of random shocks is jointly  normally distributed,  the GI
response to a shock of size equivalent to one standard deviation to the ith disturbance term is equal to
A.  7 i ek  (  j  -
1 /
2
Where 77  i = E (V  t V it) and ca  T  = E (V 2)
Summing tup, the  GI produces  an expression that  is independent of the  ordering or  any  other a-priori
restrictions.  Similarly the  GVAR  does  mot pretend to  recover  any  structural shocks.  The analysis
describes  how  the  system behaves  after  a  specific historical  shock.  Since historical  shocks  are  not
orthogonal, they do not add up to 100%.
29 They consider a third issue which is the state of the system prior to the shock and afterwards, but we do
not examine this complication here since it applies only to non-linear systems.33
Appendix 3
Variable Description and Summary of VAR estimates for each country
Argentina-
TOT-A composite index of the major commodities was constructed and the deflated by the US consumer
price index.  The commodities (and weights ) were: Beef (21%), wheat (42%), soybean (37%).  The source
for this monthly data was The World Bank, DECPG website.  The consumer price index in the  United
States is obtained from the Federal Reserve Board.
Spreads- Argentina sovereign Brady bond spreads. Source: JP Morgan.  Monthly since 1993.
Real Interest rate- Calculated with a nominal interest rate, the Argentina Money market Rate, source IFS.
Expected  inflation is estimated with an ARIMA model for the monthly seasonally adjusted data and taking
the fitted value.
Real Exchange Rate- Source IFS
Output- Index of Industrial Produ:tion. Source:
Brazil
TOT-Constructed as the ratio of the export price index to the import price index.  Source of both indeces:
Datastream.
Spreads- Brazilian sovereign Brady bond spreads. Source: JP Morgan.  Monthly since 1991.
Real  Interest rate-  Calculated with a nominal interest rate,the Brazil Money  market Rate, source IFS.
Expected  inflation is estimated with an ARIMA model for the monthly seasonally adjusted data and taking
the fitted value.
Real Exchange Rate- Source IFS
Output- Index of Industrial Production. Source:
Mexico
TOT-Two indicators were used.  A terms of trade variable computed by the central bank, and the price of
the West Texas Intermediate deflated by the US consumer price index.  The latter variable gave better
results.
Spreads- Mexican sovereign Brady bond spreads. Source:  JP Morgan.  Monthly since 1991.
Real Interest rate- Calculated with a nominal interest rate, the Mexican Money market Rate, source IFS.
Expected  inflation is estimated with an ARIMA model for the monthly seasonally adjusted data and taking
the fitted value.
Real Exchange Rate- Source IFS
Output- Index of Industrial Production. Source:
Chile
TOT- The price of copper deflated by the US consumer price index was used as a terms of trade proxy.
Spreads- Latin sovereign Brady bond spreads. Source: JP Morgan. Monthly since 1991.
Real Interest rate- Calculated with a nominal interest rate, the Deposit Rate, source IFS. Expected  inflation
is estimated with an ARIMA model for the monthly seasonally adjusted data and taking the fitted value.
Real Exchange Rate- Source IFS
Colombia
TOT-Two indicators were used.  A terms of trade variable computed as a  weighted index of the major
commodity exports and the price of the West Texas Intermediate deflated by the US consumer price index.
The latter variable gave better results.
Spreads- Latin sovereign Brady bond spreads. Source: JP Morgan. Monthly since 1991.
Real  Interest  rate-  Calculated with a  nominal interest rate,  the  Colombia  Discount Rate,  source  IFS.
Expected  inflation is estimated with an ARIMA model for the monthly seasonally adjusted data and taking
the fitted value.34
Real Exchange Rate- Source IFS
Output- Index of Industrial Production. Source:
Ecuador
TOT- A termns  of trade proxy was computed as a weighted average of the major commodity exports: oil,
bananas, shrimp, coffee and cocoa. All the indexes were deflated by the US consumer price index.
Spreads-  Latin sovereign Brady bond spreads. Source: JP Morgan.  Monthly since 1991.
Real Interest rate- Calculated with a nominal interest rate, the Ecuador Discount Rate, source IFS. Expected
inflation is estimated with an ARIMA model for the monthly seasonally adjusted data and taking the fitted
value.
Real Exchange Rate- Source IFS
Output- Index of Industrial Production. Source:
Peru
TOT- The terms of trade computed by the central bank. Source: Table 52, Nota Semanal, BCRP.
Spreads- Latin sovereign Brady bond spreads. Source: JP Morgan. Monthly since 1991.
Real Interest rate- Calculated with a nominal interest rate, the Peru Discount Rate, source IFS. Expected
inflation is estimated with an ARIMA model for the monthly seasonally adjusted data and taking the fitted
value.
Real Exchange Rate- Source IFS
Output- Index of Industrial Production. Source:
Venezuela
TOT- A terms of trade proxy was computed as a weighted average of the major commodity exports: oil,
iron, gold, aluminum and steel. All the indexes were deflated by the US consumer price index.
Spreads- Venezuela sovereign Brady bond spreads. Source: JP Morgan.  Monthly since 1991.
Real Interest rate-  Calculated with a  nominal interest  rate, the  Venezuela  Discount Rate, source IFS.
Expected  inflation is estimated with an ARIMA model for the monthly seasonally adjusted data and taking
the fitted value.
Real Exchange Rate- Source IFS
Output- Index of Industrial Production. Source:
All the variables are first-order differenced, except the real  interest rate and output growth rates.  Real
interest rates are differenced in Chile's case, and so is output growth in Peru.
Argentina  TOT  Spreads  Real  Interest  REER  Output
rate
Adj. R2  .01  .04  .05  .35  .63
S.E.  4.1  149  .04  1.64  .058
Correlation of  VAR
residuals with
TOT  1.0  -.42  -.18  -.02  .23
Spreads  1.0  .47  -.3  -.32
Real interest rate  1.0  .17  -.17
REER  1.0  .16
Output  1.035
Brazil  TOT  Spreads  Real  Interest  REER  Output
rate
Adj. RZ  .27  -.51  .22  -.36  .79
S.E.  2.31  151.7  .21  2.57  .03
Correlation of  VAR
residuals with
TOT  1.0  -.35  -.01  -.11  .064
Spreads  1.0  -.04  -.47  -.03
Real interest rate  1.0  -.19  .08
REER  1.0  .19
Output  1.0
Chile  TOT  Spreads  Real  Interest  REER  Output
rate
Adj. R  -.06  .09  .58  .027  .43
S.E.  .88  112.4  .029  2.13  .044
Correlation of  VAR
residuals with
TOT  1.0  .24  .11  -.20  .017
Spreads  1.0  .08  -.44  -.06
Real interest rate  1.0  .05  -.157
REER  1.0  .04
Output  1.0
Colombia  TOT  Spreads  Real  Interest  REER  Output
rate
Adj. R'  -.34  .42  .81  .45  .64
S.E.  12.3  89.5  .02  2.5  .036
Correlation of  VAR
residuals  with
TOT  1.0  .30  .35  -.01  -.37
Spreads  1.0  .27  -.33  .05
Real interest rate  1.0  -.18  -.38
REER  1.0  -.41
Output  1.0
Ecuador  TOT  Spreads  Real  Interest  REER  Output
rate
Adj.RL  .07  -.41  .32  .14  .99
S.E.  9.1  139.7  .08  3.57  .002
Correlation of VAR
residuals with
TOT  1.0  -.10  .06  .03  .38
Spreads  1.0  -.05  -.01  .01
Real interest rate  1.0  -.24  -.09
REER  .08
Output  1.036
Mexico  TOT  Spreads  Real  Interest  REER  Output
rate
Adj. R'  .38  .33  .33  -.02  .66
S.E.  .005  116.9  .06  4.78  .04
Correlation  of VAR
residuals  with
TOT  1.0  -.32  -.2  .13  .20
Spreads  1.0  0.8  -.8  .10
Real interest  rate  1.0  -.82  .09
REER  1.0  -.11
Output  1.0
Peru  TOT  Spreads  Real  Interest  REER  Output
rate
Adj.  -.26  .06  .61  .65  .58
S.E.  4.85  113  .07  1.93  .032
Correlation  of VAR
residuals  with
TOT  1.0  -.30  -.18  .18  .02
Spreads  1.0  .34  -.67  -.13
Real interest  rate  1.0  -.59  .05
REER  1.0  .20
Output  1.0
Venezuela  TOT  Spreads  Real  Interest  REER  Output
rate
Adj.  R'  .17  -.40  .68  .29  .74
S.E.  2.7  263  .09  6.2  .136
Correlation  of VAR
residuals  with
TOT  1.0  -.06  -.18  -.52  .14
Spreads  1.0  -.13  -.15  -.20
Real interest  rate  1.0  .06  .05
REER  1.0  -.015
Output  1.037
Coefficient of Variation of the Different Variables used in the VAR models
(standard deviation/mean)
Terms of Trade  Spreads  Domestic real  Real exchange  Output
Interest rates  Rates
Brazil  9.9  60.1  1.4  5.8  4.0
Argentina  24.8  100  0.82  1691  2.1
Mexico  6.5  53.7  1.2  81.7  1.7
Chile  8.3  370  73.7  6.7  1.1
Colombia  51.5  371  0.5  6.4  3.2
Peru  67.3  371  14.3  67.8  746.8
Venezuela  6.2  28.4  1.9  7.0  0.5
Ecuador  12.5  370  1.15  13.2  1.0
Coefficient of Variation of the Variables in Levels Breaking the Sample Period
1992-1996 and 1997-1998
TOT  Spreads  Real Interest Rates  Real Exchange Rates
92-96  97-98  92-96  97-98  92-96  l  97-98  92-96  97-98
Argentina  .07  .06  .35  .39  2.5  .50  .05  .02
Brazil  .14  .03  .28  .49  1.08  .50  .18  .03
Chile  .16  .17  .34  .47  .96  .50  .06  .02
Colombia  .12  .20  .34  .47  .50  .50  .10  .05
Mexico  .12  .20  .46  .45  1.37  .85  .17  .0438
Appendix 4
Generalized Impulse Response Functions
Argentina
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Appendix  5
Shock  identification  and persistence
As mentioned  in the text, shocks were defined as the difference  between  the projected  values of the
variables  by means  of the VAR  and  the observed  levels,  if the discrepancy  exceeded  two standard  errors  of
the equation.
Argentina-
TOT- effect lasts 12 months;  a shock  of size 4.1 (positive)  increases  yearly growth  rate by 1.3%.  Shocks
Date  and Size:  97:03  (2.9);  97:06 (-5.4);  97:09  (-5.7);  97:12  (4.4);  98:03  (-5.1);  98:06  (-6.4);  98:09  (-10.5);
98:12 (4.0);  99:03  (-15.1);  99:06  (-8.0)
Spreads  - effect lasts  10  months;  a 149  bps shock  lowers  yearly  growth  rate  by 3.0%.
Shocks  date and size: 97:07(-295);  97:11 (+358)  98:02 (-417);  98:03 (+215);  98:06 (+610);  99:04 (-204)
99:05  (+476).
Real Interest  Rate-  effect  lasts  7 months; a 4.8  percentage  points  shock  lowers  yearly  growth  rate  by 1.8%.
Shocks  date and size:  97:07  (-8.1);  97:12  (+10);  98:01  (-9.2);  98:05  (-9.5);  98:06  (+20);  99:01  (+11.5)
REER-effects  last 18 mos; a 1.9  appreciating  shock  raises  growth  by 1.5%.
Date  and size:  97:02 (6.7);  97:05  (-5.4);  98:01  (-9);  98:03  (8);  98:07  (-4.7);  99:05  (4.6)
Brazil-
TOT- effect lasts 18 months;  a shock  of size 2.4 (appreciating)  increases  yearly growth rate by 0.2%.
Shocks  Date and Size: 97:03  (-8.2);  97:06  (4.5); 97:09  (0); 97:12  (-2.4);  98:03 (3.5); 98:06  (-3.1);  98:09  (-
1); 98:12  (-4.4);  99:03  (-10);  99:06  (-4.0)
Spreads-effect  lasts  21 months;  a 150  bps shock  lowers  growth  by 1.4%.
Dates and size: 97:01 (-257);  97:05 (-342);  97:06 (282);  97:11  (258); 98:05 (317);  98:09 (516); 99:04 (-
631).
Real  Interest  Rates-Effect  lasts  9 months;  a .24  shock  lowers  growth  by .9%
Dates  and size:  97:04 (-.49);  97:08  (.5);  97:12  (.46);  98:05  (-.63)  98:07  (.61); 98:10(-.44);  98:12(.89);  99:02
(-.72);  99:05 (.77);  99:06  (-.54)
REER-Effect  lasts  one  year; a 3.3 appreciating  shock  increases  growth  by 1%.
Dates  and sizes:  97:06(-4.3);  98:06  (5.3);  98:09  (-8.7);  98:12  (-6);  99:01(-26);  99:04  (15).
Chile
TOT- effect  lasts 17 months;  a shock  of size .8 lowers  yearly  growth  rate by 0.3%.  Shocks  Date and Size:
97:03 (2.5); 97:06 (1.5); 97:09  (-1.3); 97:12  (-2.5); 98:03  (-1.3); 98:06  (-0.1); 98:09 (-1.1); 98:12 (-0.7);
99:03  (-1.5);  99:06  (-0.4)
Spreads-  Effect  lasts 15  months;  a 118  bps shock  lowers  growth  by 1.1%.
Dates and size: 97:05 (-300); 98:02 (262);  98:05 (-215);  98:08 (534); 98:09 (-306);  99:04 (-452); 99:06
(292)
Real interest  rate- effect  lasts 13  months;  a .033  shock  lowers  growth  by 1.3%
Dates  and size:  97:03 (.096);  98:02  (.08);  98:04  (-.07);  98:09  (.104);  99:03  (-10)
REER-effect  lasts  15 months;  a 2.2 (appr)  shock  increases  growth  rate  by 0.6%
Dates  and size: 97:06(7.8);  98:01  (-5.1);  98:02  (5.7);  98:07  (-4.2);  98:12  (-6.1)47
Colombia
TOT- effect lasts 21 months; a shock of size 12 lowers yearly growth rate by 0.4%. Shocks Date and Size:
97:03 (2.2); 97:06 (7.4); 97:09 (-21.3); 97:12 (4.3); 98:03 (-7.9); 98:06 (-4.9); 98:09 (-12.1); 98:12 (-0.2);
99:03 (-4.5); 99:06 (-2.0)
Spreads-effect lasts 18 months; a 94 bps lowers growth by 0.4%
Shocks date and size:  97:02 (-154); 97:06 (-254); 97:10 (290);  98:05(321); 98:07(-203); 98:09 (485);
99:04(-446).
Real interest rate-effect lasts 16 months; a .036 shock lowers growth rates by .014.
Dates and size: 97:02(.069); 97: 10(-.062);  97:11(.062); 98:08(.178); 98:11(.059); 99:06(-.19)
REER-effect lasts 18 months; a 2.4 shock lowers growth by .6%
Dates and size: 97:03 (6.3); 97:09 (-14.3) 97:11 (8.9) 98:01 (-14.3); 98:05(8.2): 98:09(-18.9); 98:10(7.9);
99:01 (-16.5); 99:03 (10)
Mexico
TOT- effect lasts 24 months; a shock of size .005 lowers yearly growth rate by 0.24%. Shocks Date and
Size: 97:03 (-.018); 97:06 (-.019); 97:09 (-.007); 97:12 (-.01); 98:03 (-.033); 98:06 (-.015); 98:09 (-0.0);
98:12 (-0.013); 99:03 (.01); 99:06 (.035)
Spreads-effect lasts 18 months; a 117  bps lowers growth by 1.6%
Shocks date and size: 97:01 (-295); 97:05 (+170); 97:07 (-360); 97:10 (+308); 98:01(+250); 98:07(-278);
98:09 (+591); 99:01(-370).
Real interest rate-effect lasts 17 months; a .057 shock lowers growth rates by .6%.
Dates and size: 97:04(-.173); 97:11(+.152); 98:04 (-.105) 98:09(+.292); 99.01(-.10); 99:02(+.19)
REER-effect lasts 24 months; a 2.4 appreciating shock increases growth by 1.2%
Dates and size: 97:03 (13.4); 97:05 (-15.6); 97:07 (+13) 97:10 (-9.6); 97:11 (8.9) 98:04 (+15) 98:09(-17.8);
99:01 (+20)48
Table A5-1
Average Historical Shocks 1997-1999
(in standard deviation units of each variable)
Shocks to:  1997  1998  1999
Argentina  TOT  -0.3  -1.1  -2.9
Spreads  0.2  1.0  3.5
Real Interest Rate  0.2  0.1  2.4
Real Exchange Rate  0.4  -1.0  2.4
Brazil  TOT  -0.6  -0.5  -2.9
Spreads  -0.1  2.8  -4.2
Real Interest Rate  0.7  0.5  -0.7
Real Exchange Rate  -1.3  -1.0  -1.8
Chile  TOT  0.1  -4.0  -2.4
Spreads  -2.7  1.7  -0.7
Real Interest Rate  2.8  1.1  -2.9
Real Exchange Rate  3.8  1.2  0.0
Colombia  TOT  -0.2  -0.5  -0.3
Spreads  -0.4  2.1  -4.7
Real Interest Rate  0.6  3.3  -5.3
Real Exchange Rate  0.1  -1.8  -2.7
Mexico  TOT  -2.8  -3.1  4.5
Spreads  -0.4  1.6  -3.2
Real Interest Rate  -0.2  1.6  0.8
Real Exchange Rate  0.8  -0.6  8.3
Source: Calculations with data from Appendix 549
Appendix 6
Generalized Variance Decomposition of  Real Interest Rates, Real Exchange Rates and External
Spreads
Table A6-1
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Real Interest Rate- Argentina
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  2  17  81  2  16
4  4  22  61  18  15
8  11  28  52  16  14
12  13  32  48  16  13
16  15  36  43  16  14
20  17  40  42  16  13
24  18  41  41  16  13
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Real Interest Rate- Brazil
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  0  9  73  34  1
4  2  11  66  27  5
8  8  28  50  27  5
12  17  29  41  23  7
16  17  31  39  23  7
20  15  35  33  29  6
24  15  38  30  29  6
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Real Interest Rates- Mexico
Horizon  Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
(in  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic Real  Real  Output
months)  Trade  Interest Rate  Exchange
Rate
1  6  71  69  55  1
4  7  67  65  55  1
8  9  57  56  51  7
12  12  49  50  46  10
16  12  43  46  44  14
20  12  40  40  39  15
24  12  36  37  36  18
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Real Interest Rate- Chile
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  4  3  90  0  5
4  4  6  68  19  7
8  7  7  54  23  12
12  6  7  44  28  13
16  6  9  45  26  14
20  7  10  44  26  14
24  7  10  43  25  1450
Table A6-  1 (Continued)
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Real Interest Rate- Colombia
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  .9  5  94  1  28
4  30  24  77  6  20
8  23  24  81  7  19
12  29  25  72  12  15
16  27  26  70  12  14
20  26  25  66  12  14
24  30  24  62  11  13
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Real Interest Rate- Peru
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  2  25  90  31  1
4  8  33  74  39  2
8  9  40  68  39  3
12  20  44  56  30  6
16  20  44  57  32  6
20  22  46  54  31  6
24  23  45  53  30  7
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Real Interest Rate Venezuela
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  18  4  81  2  8
4  36  4  43  21  25
8  31  7  36  24  26
12  24  7  28  19  39
16  20  17  25  15  40
20  18  16  27  14  39
24  15  39  19  11  32
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Real Interest Rate- Ecuador
l  l  Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  1  2  94  4  11
4  5  4  78  9  9
8  4  22  61  10  5
12  5  25  54  14  6
16  5  33  47  11  6
20  5  33  47  11  7
24  6  33  47  11  651
Table A6-2
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of  Spreads - Argentina
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  14  81  19  8  23
4  15  62  22  17  20
8  18  58  28  15  17
12  22  58  26  14  16
16  21  59  26  14  16
20  22  60  25  15  17
24  24  61  25  14  16
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Spreads - Brazil
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  13  97  0  19  2
4  12  89  4  19  3
8  17  82  6  15  2
12  17  77  7  16  3
16  18  75  8  17  3
20  18  73  8  17  4
24  18  70  8  20  4
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of  Spreads  -Mexico
Horizon  Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
(in  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic Real  Real  Output
months)  Trade  Interest Rate  Exchange
Rate
1  10  89  52  54  8
4  10  63  41  45  5
8  10  57  39  37  11
12  11  49  34  38  11
16  13  49  30  35  11
20  15  46  29  34  13
24  16  45  l  29  34  14
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Spreads - Chile
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  2  88  8  14  6
4  9  72  8  17  9
8  9  63  8  20  17
12  9  57  10  19  16
16  10  54  12  19  16
20  10  51  13  18  15
24  10  51  14  18  1552
Table A6-2 (Continued)
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Spreads - Colombia
Percentage of the Variance Associated  with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  79  83  25  13  1
4  13  68  18  22  8
8  37  44  15  13  11
12  36  41  14  21  13
16  37  41  13  22  12
20  30  36  21  28  11
24  32  32  21  28  10
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of  Spreads  - Peru
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  5  83  13  44  8
4  9  72  14  40  15
8  10  72  13  41  15
12  23  56  11  32  24
16  24  53  10  31  24
20  25  52  9  31  24
24  27  50  9  29  25
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Spreads - Venezuela
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  6  65  3  13  6
4  12  71  3  15  22
8  11  64  6  16  22
12  12  62  6  17  21
16  12  62  6  17  20
20  13  62  5  14  28
24  13  56  6  13  33
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Spreads - Ecuador
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  1  95  4  3  2
4  5  86  1  7  2
8  4  76  2  12  6
12  5  70  5  14  6
16  6  62  12  15  5
20  6  57  11  18  7
24  6  57  12  17  753
Table A6-3
Generalized  Variance Decomposition of Real Exchange  Rate -Argentina
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  l Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  1  26  5  80  9
4  6  23  11  62  12
8  14  21  26  40  12
12  15  28  25  38  13
16  16  31  23  38  12
20  1S  32  25  35  11
24  18  32  l  24  35  12
Generalized Variance Decomposition of Real Exchange Rate- Brazil
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  2  25  6  95  4
4  4  28  10  79  10
8  7  28  13  73  10
12  9  37  11  65  9
16  11  41  11  59  8
20  11  43  11  56  8
24  11  41  10  56  8
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Real Exchange Rate- Mexico
Horizon  Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
(in  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic Real  Real  Output
months)  Trade  Interest Rate  Exchange
Rate
1  5  62  52  82  5
4  10  52  42  65  9
8  12  47  40  53  12
12  13  45  39  53  11
16  13  43  36  47  13
20  13  40  33  44  15
24  13  38  32  42  16
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Real Exchange Rate- Chile
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  6  27  2  88  2
4  8  26  4  75  8
8  13  30  5  64  14
12  12  31  6  61  15
16  13  31  7  58  15
20  12  33  6  56  15
24  13  33  7  55  1454
Table A6-3 (Continued)
Generalized Variance Decomposition of Real Exchange  Rate- Colombia
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  1  30  3  81  16
4  7  24  17  49  15
8  10  18  25  32  17
12  15  23  22  29  18
16  15  21  22  30  19
20  22  21  20  25  14
24  27  19  20  20  12
Generalized Variance Decomposition of Real Exchange Rate- Peru
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  3  54  15  92  5
4  6  47  23  74  4
8  12  36  22  57  17
12  21  36  21  49  18
16  29  34  18  43  19
20  31  34  18  38  19
24  32  33  17  37  20
Generalized Variance Decomposition of Real Exchange Rate- Venezuela
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  34  1  1  94  1
4  28  5  2  77  14
8  17  42  5  35  12
12  14  39  7  28  27
16  15  37  8  27  28
20  14  46  8  23  26
24  11  50  7  18  30
Generalized Variance Decomposition of Real Exchange Rate- Ecuador
Percentage of the Variance Associated with Shock to:
Horizon  Terms of  Spreads  Domestic  Real  Output
(in  Trade  Real Interest  Exchange
months)  Rate  Rate
1  0  12  6  82  1
4  6  24  9  57  2
8  10  28  9  47  9
12  9  30  10  46  8
16  9  31  10  45  7
20  10  31  10  43  7
24  9  32  11  41  755
Appendix 7
Correlation Between VAR Forecast Errors and Potentially Important Omitted Variables
The issue of model specification is treated in some detail in Appendix 8, but only pertaining to a single
variable: the choice between spreads (prices) or capital flows (quantities) to capture the international credit
markets.  However, the set of variables that could be potentially important determining output fluctuations
is very long.  Such is the case of fiscal-related variables such as the fiscal deficit or public expenditure.
Other variables that could be important were related to financial market variables different than the real
interest rate, like the growth of domestic credit to the private sector, trying to capture availability of funds.
Similarly, the current account balance of the country captures financing by the rest of the world. Financial
vulnerability could also be  important and we used  the change in short term  debt or the  change in the
M2/Reserves ratio.
We narrowed the choice to a few of these variables, given the small sample limitations.  Since some of
these variables are  recorded with a  different frequency (annual or quarterly) we  adopted a  suggestive
testing strategy, consisting of estimating the (annual average) forecast errors of the VAR models (actual
values minus forecasted values) for each country and performed rank correlations of these errors with each
of  the  potentially  important omitted variables.  This method  would show  any  systematic correlation
between  our  model  overpredicting or  underpredicting growth  in those  cases  where,  say,  government
expenditure growth was high or low, or current account deficits were high or low, etc.
Since this set of variables could be affected by the same set of variables that were used to forecast growth
(TOT, spreads, real interest rates, real exchange rates and lagged growth) we attempted to correct for this
endogeneity by using lagged values of the fiscal deficit, government expenditure, current account, etc.  This
exercise is summarized in Tables I a and 2a. The rankings were done for the period 1997-1999.
Alternatively, we orthogonalized (by  means of  a  linear regression) these variables with respect  to the
variables used to forecast growth.  These results are presented in table 2a and 2b.  Given the magnitude of
Venezuela's forecast error, the rankings were done including and excluding that country from the sample.
Given  that we  use  contemporaneous variables, and we  don't  have  1999 data for most  variables,  the
correlations were done for 1997 and 1998.
Summarizing the results:  there is no systematic relationship between the forecast errors and any of the
tested variables.  Probably, the lagged current account balance is the only case where the sign is the same
and the size of the coefficient hints at any significance.
Rank Correlations, Table la and Table 2a:
The residual rank correlations were
constructed by correlating the rankings of the VAR forecast errors (differences between the observed minus
the forecasted values)with the rakings of the variables in levels at t- 1.  This was done alternatively including
and excluding Venezuela in the sample.
Residual Rank Correlations, Table lb  and Table 2b:
The residual rank correlations were derived
by running time series regressions #1, #2, and #3 for each country separately; the orthogonal residuals
(contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error terms in the VARs) were then ranked and correlated with
the rankings of the difference between the observed minus the forecasted values of the VARs of each
country in period t.
Regression #1
Y, = alI  +a 2embi,  + cX 3reert + cc 4rt + a5t°tt  +
Regression #256
Yt = P  -f3 2reer, + :3r, + P4tot, +-
Regression 43
Y,  = 6I -6 2kat+ 63rer't  + 64rt - 65tO'Ct  + W"t
Table Ia.  Rank Correlations
Change  Change  Budget Deficit  CAB  IChange  in  Change  in  Domes
M2/Reserves  STDIReserves  (%  to GDP)  (% to GDP)  Public  Domestic  Credit
Expenditures  Credit  (% to G
1997  0.24  L  0.24  -0.12  (% to GDP)  (% to GDP) I
1997~  0.24  - 0.-24-4  -0.12  0.14  0.26  -0.12  0.1
1998F  -0.21  -0.52  -0.50  -0.24  0.00  -0.67  0.1
1999  0.14  0.24  0.01  0.64  0.00  0.55  -0.
Note:  Used  the rankings  of the  difference  between  observed  minus  forecasted  and  the rankings  of  the variables  in
at t-1
Table lb.  Rank Correlations
Change  r  Change  Budget  CAB  |Change  Public Change in  Domestic
M2iReserves  I STD/Reserves  Deficit  (%  to GDP) Expenditures  Domestic  Credit
(% toGDP)  (%GtoDP)  Credit  (% to ______K__________________  ________  ____________(%  to  GDP)  GDP)
1997  -0.14  -0.14  0.32  0.71  -0.11  -0.43  -0.36
1998  -0.82  -0.29  -0.32  0.88  0.32  -0.50  -0.29
1999  -0.29  0.04  0.23  0.46  0.21  0.32  -0.11
Note:  Venezuela  not included. Used  the rankings  of the  difference  between
observed minus forecasted and the rankings of the variables in levels at t-1
Table 2a. Residual Rank Correlations
Change in  Change in  Budget Deficit  CAB  IChange  Change in  Domestic
M2/Reserves i STD/Reserves  (% to GDP)  (% to GDP)  Public  Domestic  |Credit
Expenditures  Credit  :(%  to GDP
l______  ______________________  ___________  (% to GDP)  (% to GDP) i
1997  -0.17  -0.52  0.31  0.76  -0.19  -0.10  -0.22
Eq.1  _  __
1998  0.81  0.19  -0.19  -0.62  -0.02  -0.05  0.65
Eq.1  i _
1S  997  0.10  0.05  -0.48  0.12  -0.19  -0.24  -0.02
E  q  .2  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
p1998  -0.19  -0.36  -0.14  -0.52  L  -0.05  |  0.14  0.33
Eq.2_|_I__I_|_
1997  0.17  I  0.17  -0.31  -0.17  -0.36  0.07  -0.07
Eq.3  I  l  I  I
11998  -0.21  -0.38  -0.24  -0.24  -0.02  -0.05  I  0.14
[Eq.3  __I  _  l57
Table  2b. Residual  Rank  Correlations
Change  in  Change  in  Budget  CAB  Change  Public Change  in  Domestic
M21Reserves  STD/Reserves  Deficit  (% to GDP) Expenditures  Domestic  Credit
(%  to GDP)  (%  to GDP)  Credit  (%  to GDP)
_  _  _  _  _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _ E  _ _  _ _  _  .(%  to G  D  P)
1997  0.14  9  0.00  0.64  0.18  0.36  0.36
~E  q .1  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
1998  0.79  -0.21  0.21  0.07  0.00  0.68
Eq.1
1997  -0.29  -0.07  -0.25  0.68  -0.04  0.29  -0.54
Eq.2  ____  _____
1998  -0.43  -0.39  -0.11  -0.29  0.07  0.07  0.00
E q.2  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
1997  . -0.25  F  0.04  0.00  0.25  -0.07  0.61  -0.39
Eq.3  _  ,  _  029  I
1998  -0.46  0.29  0.00  0.14  -0.29  0.04  -0.11
E q.3  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Note Venezuela not included.
Independent  Variables:  Definitions and sources.
EMBI: Emerging Market Bond Index (J.P. Morgan, Inc.)
REER: Real Effective Exchange Rate
The source was  the IFS database,  IMF.
r: Real interest rate (ex-post).
r=((  I +inom/ 100)/(  I +1I00)-1  )  |00
where
= nominal interest rate
7, = inflation.
Money Market Rates were used in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Deposit rates in the case of
Chile, and discount rates in the cases of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The source was IMF,
iFS database.
Terms of Trade: Index, 1990=100. Source Inter-American Development Bank Statistics and Quantitative
Analysis Unit.
Dependent  Variables:  Definitions and sources.
-M2:  Money plus quasimoney (IMF,IFS: lines 34 and 35)
-Reserves: International Reserves minus gold (IMF, IFS: line lId)
-Short Term Debt: Liabilities to banks due within a year (Joint BIS, IMF, OECD, World Bank Statistics.58
-Budget Deficit (,%to  GDP): Non-financial  public sector balance (Domestic National Sources and World
Bank staff estima-es)
Current Account Baiance (% to GDP): Source: Domestic national sources and World Bank staff estimates.
Change in Public Expenditures: Public Expenditures are in percentages to GDP. Non-financlal public
sector in the cases of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela. Central government in
the cases of Brazil and Peru. Irn  the cases of Argentina (1980-82) and Venezuela (1980-83), changes in
central government expenditures were used as proxies for the years because of the lack of data on non-
financial public sector expenditures during those years. For Brazil (1994-98), National Treasury
Performance Summary was used due to lack of data on central government expenditures during that period
of time.
Domestic Credit: Private domestic credit. The source was iDB Statistical and Quantitative Analysis Unit.
Domestic Credit data was used from the IMF IFS whenever data was missing from the IDB database.59
Appendix 7
Model Selection Issues- Spreads or Capital Flows ?
This appendix presents details of the two alternative model selection procedures, the nested hypothesis
approach and the non-nested tests.  The first approach follows Gourieroux and Monfort( 1997), while the
second one  is based mainly on Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and  Weeks (1999)  The first
approach, based on  a general to specific modeling strategy, seeks to determine the validity of a  set of
parametric restrictions by which one model (the restricted one including only spreads) can be derived from
a more general one. This testing strategy verifies the informational value of one variable (capital flows),
conditional on the  other one  (spreads) being included.  Tables below  show different  statistics for the
amplified VAR (VAR-A) and the restricted VAR including spreads only and capital flows only. In every
case we are unable to reject the restriction that the capital flows should be excluded, given that the spreads
were included 30. However, given that our interest was focused on output, we performed some tests on the
output equation only,  but still in the  nested hypothesis framework.  That  is,  given that  spreads were
included, we performed a Wald Test to verify the restriction that the capital flows coefficients were zero: in
Brazil, Colombia and Mexico we reject the statistical significance of the restriction, implying that in these
countries the capital flows proxy lhas  additional information not contained in the spreads 31.
However, repeating the same exercise to test the informational value of spreads, conditional on the capital
flows being included, similar results emerge in the sense that the restricted modcl is selected, but this time
including capital flows.  The single equation Wald Test on the restriction that the spreads coefficients are
equal to zero is rejectL  1 for all the cases, except for Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.  This implies that in the
major countries of the region, spreads are informative for output growth even after capital flows have been
accounted for.
The second approach we used to verify potential problems in our model selection consisted of the Non-
nested hypothesis testing (Pesaran and Weeks, 1999). Based on several tests (Pesaran & Pesaran, 1997) we
examine the hypothesis that we are dealing with "competing" models and one has to be chosen over the
other.  Tables below summarize the results for each country, considering that Model 1 includes the spreads
variable and Model 2 includes the capital flows variable. Some ambiguity emerges because the tests point
in different direction and there's no rule as to which test is more powerful, except for some small-sample
properties of some of them.  Based on these considerations, we conclude that in Colombia, Mexico, Peru
and Ecuador, the model with capital flows seems to better fit the data; Chile is a borderline case.
A) Nested Hypothesis Testing
This section shows the VAR system statistics (maximised loglikelihood and Schwarz) and single (output)
equation Wald Tests to test the restrictions on the coefficients on the output equation.  All theVARs were
estimated with identical number of lags (12), except in Argentina where the amplified model was run with
a shorter lag length (6) due to data restrictions.
30  Note that the  Loglikelihood function (LLF)  of the restricted model is always superior to that  of the
unrestricted model.  Additionally, the likelihood ratio statistic, computed as twice the difference between
the  unrestricted  and  restricted LLF (  Gourieroux and  Monfont, 1997) is generally  a  negative number
leading to the inability to reject the restriction.  The Schwarz criterion is also minimized in the restricted
version always.
31 These three countries account for  65% of the aggregate GDP of the sample countries.  Probably this  is
why in the regional Panel estimation of the single output equation the  flows variable turned  out to be
significant.60
VAR statistics for the Amplified VAR (VAR-A) and the Restricted Versions: only spreads (VAR-RS) and
only capital flows (VAR-RK)
VAR-A  VAR-RS  VAR-RK
(Includes SPR and KFL)  (Restriction: KFLO=0)  (Restriction: SPR=0)
ARG-Log Likelihood  -514.4  -265.8  -371.1
Schwarz  37.7  23.0  26.7
BRA  Log Likelihood  -777.1  -438.5  -77.6
Schwarz  42.0  26.8  18
CHL  Log Likelihood  -381.0  -189.9  -231.0
Schwarz  32.5  20.8  21.8
COL Log Likelihood  -459.0  -361.0  -416
Schwarz  34.4  24.9  26.3
ECU Log Likelihood  -416.1  -244.0  -168.5
Schwarz  33.3  22.1  20.3
MEX Log Likelihood  -137.9  196.4  -45.9
Schwarz  26.6  11.5  17.3
PER  Log Likelihood  -621.8  -426.3  -468.6
Schwarz  38.3  26.5  27.5
VEN Log Likelihood  -902.4  -622.2  -641.6
Schwarz  45.1  31.2  31.7
Wald Test Statistics for Hypothesis Testing in the Output Equation of the VAR
Hypothesis: KFL coefficients=O  Hypothesis: SPR coefficients=0
Statistic (p-value)  Decision  Statistic (p-value)  Decision
ARG  8.6 (.38)  Unable to reject  15.3 (.05)  Reject
BRA  28.0 (.01)  Reject  31.7 (.01)  Reject
CHL  17.2 (.14)  Unable to reject  25.3 (.01)  Reject
COL  39.0 (.00)  Reject  30.5 (.01)  Reject
ECU  12.7 (.39)  Unable to reject  8.9 (.71)  Unable to reject
MEX  20.4 (.06)  Reject  34.2 (.00)  Reject
PER  17.3 (.14)  Unable to reject  14.5 (.27)  Unable to reject
VEN  3.5 (.99)  Unable to reject  1.8 (1.0)  Unable to reject
B) Non-nested hypothesis tests
These tests are summarized in Pesaran & Pesaran (1997) and thoroughly discussed in Pesaran and Weeks
(1999).  Here we will only list the tests and the original authors, referring the reader to the above referenced
literature for more details.
N Test- Cox test derived in Pesaran (1974)
NT-test- derived in Godfrey and Pesaran (1983)
W-test Wald type test proposed in Godfrey and Pesaran (1983)
J-test- Proposed by Davidson and McKinnon (1981)
JA-test- Due to Fisher and McAleer (1981)
Encompassing test -Mizon  and Richard (1986)61
Tests  for  the  Non-  Nested  Hypothesis  of  the  Model  with  Spreads  (Model  1) agaainst  1rh  Mode  with  Capital
Flows  (Model  2)-  Argentina-_
I  __________________________-M  Mi against  M 2  M l  agains1  Ivi  2
N-  Test  -3.34  (.001)  10  O3  )
NT-test  - .087  (.931)  -1  '  0  '
W-test  .087(931)  .62 
J  Test  1.94  (.052)  3.405  _,__G^;"  I
JA  test  .171  (.864)  |  205  (0.8-!'
Encompassing  .805  (.555)  2  ( 0C  j
Schwarz  test  of  MI  vs.  M2  5.68  favors  M  I
Tests  for  the  Non-  Nested  Hypothesis  of-the  Modei  with  Spreads  (Model  I)  against  tie  vOouk with  Canital
Flows  (Model  2)-  Brazil
_______________  M1  against  M2  M2  agaionst  1% 
N- Test  -6.75 (.000)  -10 49 (  7
NT-test  t  -.085  (.932)  4'18  ( 46)
W-test  -.084  (.933)  1.691  M  .4 90)
J  Test  3.147  (.002)  4L01  (.0000
JA  test  _  -. 269  (.788)  .83  1  _  'A4Q6)
Encompassing  2.33  (.094)  2. 64  (.067)  _
Schwarz  test  of  M 1 vs.  M2  3.86  favors  MI
Tests  for  the  Non-  Nested  Hypothesis  of the  Model  with  Spreads  (Model  1) against  th-e Model  with  Capital
Flows  (Model  2)-  Chile
Ml  against  M2  M2  against  MI
N-  Test  .465  (.642)  -13.77  (000)
NT-test  1 1.503  (.133)  -.031  (.975)
W-test  1,777  (.076)  -.031  (.975)
J Test  1.836  (.066)  5.05  (.000)
JA  test  -3.65  (.000)  .056  (.955)
Encompassing  1.43  (.289)  2.1  05  (124)_  _
Schwarz  test  of  MI  vs.  M2  10.79  favors  M 1 
Tests  for  the  Non-  Nested  Hypothesis  of the  Model  with  Spreads  (Model  1) against  the  MvIodel with  Capital
Flows  (Model  2)-  Coloinbia
_____________  Ml  against  M2  |  _  M2  against  M-___I
N-  Test  -11.11  (.000)  -5.29  (0)  OQf
NT-test  -1.26  (.208)  -.244  (.807)
W-test  -1.11  (.266)  -.238  (.812)
J Test  6.51  (.000)  4.50  (.000)
JA  test  .163  (.871)  -.938  (.348)
Encompassing  3.25  (.035)  2.54  (.074)  l
Schwarz  test  of MI  vs. M2  I  -7.92  favors M262
Tests for the Non- Nested Hypothesis of the Model with Spreads (Model 1) against the Model with Capital
Flows (Model 2)- Ecuador
MI against M2  M2 against MI
N- Test  -11.33 (.000)  -8.48 (.000)
NT-test  -.677 (.498)  -.218 (.827)
W-test  -.631 (.528)  -.214 (.830)
J Test  4.09 (.000)  3.31 (.001)
JA test  .662 (.508)  .986 (.324)
Encompassing  L.06 (.472)  .739 (.695)
Schwarz test of MI vs. M2  -7.64 favors M2
Tests for the Non- Nested Hypothesis of the Model with Spreads (Model 1) against the Model with Capital
Flows (Model 2)- Mexico
Ml against M2  M2 against MI
N- Test  -14.41 (.000)  -1.02 (.31)
NT-test  -1.95 (.051)  .716 (.474)
W-test  -1.62 (.106)  .773 (.44)
J Test  5.67 (.000)  1.793 (.073)
JA test  2.88 (.004)  -1.42 (.155)
Encompassing  2.85 (.053)  1.69 (.205)
Schwarz test of MI  vs. M2  -15.62  favors M2
Tests for the Non- Nested Hypothesis of the Model with Spreads (Model 1) against the Model with Capital
Flows (Model 2)- Peru
MI against M2  M2 against MI
N- Test  -16.80 (.000)  -5.81 (.000)
NT-test  -.657 (.511)  .109 (.913)
W-test  -.621 (.535)  .111 (.912)
J Test  4.796 (.000)  3.64 (.000)
JA test  -.034 (.973)  -1.203 (.229)
Encompassing  1.44  (.286)  1.209 (.387)
Schwarz test of MI  vs. M2  -4.44 favors M2
Tests for the Non- Nested Hypothesis of the Model with Spreads (Model 1) against the Model with Capital
Flows (Model 2)- Venezuela
MI against M2  M2 against MI
N- Test  -7.21 (.000)  -3.59 (.000)
NT-test  .53 (.596)  1.00 (.315)
W-test  .567 (.571)  1.11 (.263)
J Test  2.47 (.014)  1.61 (.545)
JA test  .698 (.485)  .604 (.545)
Encompassing  .296 (.975)  .152 (.998)
Schwarz test of MI vs. M2  -5.67 favors M2Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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